Pimentel et al. v. Legal Education Board, et al. G.R. No. 230642, Sept. 10, 2019
Pimentel et al. v. Legal Education Board, et al.
G.R. No. 230642, Sept. 10, 2019
FACTS Prompted by clamors for the improvement of the system of the legal education on account of the poor performance of law students and law schools in the bar examinations, the Congress passed into law R.A. No. 7662 which created the LEB. The LEB enacted Memorandum No. 7, series of 2016 requiring all those seeking admission to the basic law course to take and pass a nationwide uniform law school admission test known as Philsat. Petitions filed a petition for prohibition principally seeking that R.A. No. 7662 be declared unconstitutional and that the creation of the LEB be invalidated together with all its issuances, most especially the PhiLSAT, for encroaching upon the rule-making power of the Court concerning admissions to the practice of law; They prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent the LEB from conducting the PhiLSAT. Whether or not the Court has the jurisdiction over legal education; Whether or not the LEB’s power pursuant to RA NO. 7662 is unconstitutional.
RULING
No, the definition of the practice of law, no matter how broad, cannot be further enlarged as to cover the study of law.
The Constitution lays down the powers which the Court can exercise. Among these is the power to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law. Accordingly, the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar has been interpreted as vesting upon the Court the authority to define the practice of law, to determine who will be admitted to the practice of law, to hold in contempt any person found to be engaged in unauthorized practice of law, and to exercise corollary disciplinary authority over members of the Bar. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. However, the definition of the practice of law, no matter how broad, cannot be further enlarged as to cover the study of law.
- On the LEB’S power under RA No. 7662 vis-à-vis the Court’s jurisdiction the court ruled as follows:
- Sec. 3(a)(2) on increasing awareness among members of the legal profession on the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors: This provision goes beyond the scope of R.A. No. 7662, i.e., improvement of the quality of legal education, and, instead delves into the training of those who are already members of the bar. Likewise, this objective is a direct encroachment on the power of the Court to promulgate rules concerning the practice of law and legal assistance to the underprivileged and should, thus, be voided on this ground.
- Section 2, par. 2 and Section 7(g) on legal apprenticeship and law practice internship as a requirement for taking the bar: Under Section 7(g), the power of the LEB is no longer confined within the parameters of legal education, but now dabbles on the requisites for admissions to the bar examinations, and consequently, admissions to the bar. This is a direct encroachment upon the Court's exclusive authority to promulgate rules concerning admissions to the bar and should, therefore, be struck down as unconstitutional.
- Section 2, par. 2 and Section 7(h) on continuing legal education of practicing lawyers: the clause "continuing legal education" under Section 2, par. 2, and Section 7(h) of R.A. No. 7662 unduly give the LEB the power to supervise the legal education of those who are already members of the bar. Inasmuch as the LEB is authorized to compel mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the LEB deems, necessary, the same encroaches upon the Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the Integrated Bar which includes the education of "lawyer-professors" as teaching of law is practice of law. The mandatory continuing legal education of the members of the bar is, in fact, covered by B.M. No. 850 or the Rules on Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) dated August 22, 2000 which requires members of the bar, not otherwise exempt, from completing, every three years, at least 36 hours of continuing legal education activities approved by the MCLE Committee directly supervised by the Court.
- Section 7(e) on minimum standards for law admission and the PhiLSAT issuances: The Court finds no constitutional conflict between its rule-making power and the power of the LEB to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662. Consequently, the PhiLSAT, which intends to regulate admission to law schools, cannot be voided on this ground.
Accordingly, the LEB's power under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission should be read with the State policy behind the enactment of R.A. No. 7662 which is fundamentally to uplift the standards of legal education and the law's thrust to undertake reforms in the legal education system. Construing the LEH's power to prescribe the standards for law admission together with the LEB's other powers to administer, supervise, and accredit law schools, leads to the logical interpretation that the law circumscribes the LEB's power to prescribe admission requirements only to those seeking enrollment to a school or college of law and not to the practice of law.
Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662, insofar as it gives the LEB the power to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission is faithful to the reasonable supervision and regulation clause. It merely authorizes the LEB to prescribe minimum requirements not amounting to control.
The subject of the PhiLSAT is to improve the quality of legal education. It is indubitable that the State has an interest in prescribing regulations promoting education and thereby protecting the common good. Improvement of the quality of legal education, thus, falls squarely within the scope of police power. The PhiLSAT, as an aptitude test, was the means to protect this interest.
LEB’S POWERS VIS-À-VIS INSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDMO AND RIGHT TO EDUCATION
The provisions that exclude and disqualify those examinees who fail to reach the prescribed passing score from being admitted to any law school in the Philippines. In mandating that only applicants who scored at least 55% correct answers shall be admitted to any· law school, the PhiLSAT actually usurps the right and duty of the law school to determine for itself the criteria for the admission of students and thereafter, to apply such criteria on a case-by-case basis. It also mandates law schools to absolutely reject applicants with a grade lower than the prescribed cut-off score and those with expired PhiLSAT eligibility. The token regard for institutional academic freedom comes into play, if at all, only after the applicants had been "pre-selected" without the school's participation. The right of the institutions then are constricted only in providing "additional" admission requirements, admitting of the interpretation that the preference of the school itself is merely secondary or supplemental to that of the State which is antithetical to the very principle of reasonable supervision and regulation.
The law schools are left with absolutely no discretion to choose its students at the first instance and in accordance with its own policies, but are dictated to surrender such discretion in favor of a State-determined pool of applicants, under pain of administrative sanctions and/or payment of fines.
Similarly, the requirement that an applicant obtain a specific number of units in English, Mathematics, and Social Science subjects affects a law school's admission policies leaving the latter totally without discretion to admit applicants who are deficient in these subjects or to allow such applicant to complete these requirements at a later time. This requirement also effectively extends the jurisdiction of the LEB to the courses and units to be taken by the applicant in his or her pre-law course. Moreover, such requirement is not to be found under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court as this section simply requires only the following from an applicant to the bar exams. For instance, this requirement effectively nullifies the option of admitting non-law graduates on the basis of relevant professional experience that a law school, pursuant to its own admissions policy, may otherwise have considered.
Section 7(c) and 7(e) on the minimum qualifications of faculty members:
In this regard, the LEB is actually assessing the teaching performance of faculty members and when such is determined by the LEB as constituting gross incompetence, the LEB may mete out penalties, thus, usurping the law school's right to determine for itself the competence of its faculty members.
