CRIMINAL LAW II CASE DIGEST/ BACLAYON V. MUTIA, 129 SCRA 148

BACLAYON V. MUTIA,

129 SCRA 148

TOPIC/DOCTRINE

Conditions should be interpreted with flexibility in their application and each case should be judged on its own merits—on the basis of the problems, needs and capacity of the probationer. The very liberality of the probation should not be made a tool by trial courts to stipulate instead unrealistic terms.

FACTS

Petitioner, Florentina L. Baclayon was convicted of the crime of Serious Oral Defamation for having quarreled with and uttered insulting and defamatory words against Remedios Estillore, principal of the Plaridel Central School.

The CA/IAC affirmed her conviction and increased the penalty imposed by respondent judge and sentenced her to 1 year 8 months 21 days of arresto mayor in its maximum period to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional in its minimum period. The sentence was promulgated on September 9, 1981, and on the same date Baclayon applied for probation with respondent judge who referred the application to a Probation Officer. The Post-sentence Investigation Report favorably recommended the granting of petitioner’s probation for a period of 3 years.

On Dec 21, 1981, respondent Judge issued an order granting Baclayon’s probation by modified the Probation Officer’s recommendation by increasing the period of probation to 5 years and imposed some condition. One of the condition was, “to refrain from continuing her teaching profession,” to which Baclayon contends; alleging grave abut of discretion in the imposition of the said condition. She submits that said condition is not only detrimental and prejudicial to her rights but is also not in accordance with the purposes, objective and benefits of the probation law and prays that said condition be deleted from the order granting her probation.

ISSUE

Did the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion in giving the assailed condition?

RULING

Yes.

The conditions which trial courts may impose on a probationer may be classified into general or mandatory and special or discretionary. The mandatory conditions, enumerated in Section 10 of the Probation Law, require that the probationer should (a) present himself to the probation officer designated to undertake his supervision at such place as may be specified in the order within 72 hours from receipt of said order, and (b) report to the probation officer at least once a month at such time and place as specified by said officer. Special or discretionary conditions are those additional conditions, listed in the same Section 10 of the Probation Law, which the courts may additionally impose on the probationer towards his correction and rehabilitation outside of prison. The enumeration, however, is not inclusive. Probation statutes are liberal in character and enable courts to designate practically any term it chooses as long as the probationer’s constitutional rights are not jeopardized. There are innumerable conditions which may be relevant to the rehabilitation of the probationer when viewed in their specific individual context. It should, however, be borne in mind that the special or discretionary conditions of probation should be realistic, purposive and geared to help the probationer develop into a law-abiding and self-respecting individual. Conditions should be interpreted with flexibility in their application and each case should be judged on its own merits—on the basis of the problems, needs and capacity of the probationer. The very liberality of the probation should not be made a tool by trial courts to stipulate instead unrealistic terms.

Here, the court held that Court may not impose as a condition for grant of probation that probationer should not continue her teaching profession. While it is true that probation is a mere privilege and its grant rests solely upon the discretion of the court, this discretion is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. Equal regard to the demands of justice and public interest must be observed. In this case, teaching has been the lifetime and only calling and profession of petitioner. The law requires that she devote herself to a lawful calling and occupation during probation. Yet, to prohibit her from engaging in teaching would practically prevent her from complying with the terms of the probation.