Cayetano v. Monsod G.R. No. 100113, Sept. 3, 1991
Cayetano v. Monsod
G.R. No. 100113, Sept. 3, 1991
FACTS Renato L. Cayetano filed a petition challenging the qualification of Christian Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) after being appointed by President Corazon C. Aquino and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The crux of Cayetano’s petition is that Monsod does not meet the constitutional requirement of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Monsod, a member of the Philippine Bar since passing the bar examinations in 1960, was nominated by President Aquino in a letter received by the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. The Commission on Appointments confirmed Monsod’s nomination on June 5, 1991. Subsequently, Monsod took his oath of office and assumed the position on June 18, 1991. Cayetano, as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, praying that the confirmation and appointment of Monsod be declared null and void due to Monsod’s alleged non-compliance with the ten-year law practice requirement. Does Christian Monsod meet the constitutional requirement of “engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years” for his appointment as COMELEC Chairman to be valid?
RULING
Yes, because the “practice of law” was clarified to go beyond traditional courtroom appearances, revealing a modern interpretation congruent with the complexities of today’s legal and corporate environments.
The Court held that the term “practice of law” encompasses a broad range of activities beyond appearing in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, preparation of legal instruments and contracts, participation in negotiations where legal knowledge is applied, and involvement in activities that require the regular application of law. To assess whether an individual has been “engaged in the practice of law,” one should consider: the frequency of the activity (habitual versus occasional), the nature of the activity (whether it involves the application of law), and the presence of compensation for legal services rendered.
Here, the Court provided a comprehensive analysis of what constitutes the “practice of law” and concluded that Monsod’s diverse legal experiences cumulatively met the constitutional requirement. The Court reasoned that the practice of law is not limited to courtroom participation but includes legal work performed in various capacities, which utilize legal knowledge and expertise.