CIVIL PROCEDURE | Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v. Paras G.R. No. 161909, April 25, 2012
Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v. Paras
G.R. No. 161909, April 25, 2012
FACTS: The case involves a breach of contract of carriage by Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. (Philtranco) which resulted in a collision with another bus owned by Inland Trailways, Inc. (Inland). The collision caused serious physical injuries to the plaintiff, Felix Paras, who was a passenger on Inland's bus, as well as material damage to Inland's bus. Paras filed a complaint for damages against Inland, alleging breach of contract of carriage. Inland filed a third-party complaint against Philtranco and its driver, Apolinar Miralles, seeking exoneration of its liabilities and asserting that Philtranco and Miralles were responsible for the accident due to their negligence. Whether impleading Philtranco and its driver through the third-party complaint filed on March 2, 1990 was correct.
RULING: Yes. The requisites for a third-party action are, firstly, that the party to be impleaded must not yet be a party to the action; secondly, that the claim against the third-party defendant must belong to the original defendant; thirdly, the claim of the original defendant against the third-party defendant must be based upon the plaintiff’s claim against the original defendant; and, fourthly, the defendant is attempting to transfer to the third-party defendant the liability asserted against him by the original plaintiff.
The case at bar is one in which the third party defendants are brought into the action as directly liable to the plaintiffs upon the allegation that “the primary and immediate cause as shown by the police investigation of said vehicular collision between (sic) the above-mentioned vehicles was the recklessness and negligence and lack of imprudence (sic) of the third-party defendant Philtranco and Miralles then driver of the passenger bus.” The effects are that “plaintiff and third party are at issue as to their rights respecting the claim” and “the third party is bound by the adjudication as between him and plaintiff.” It is not indispensable in the premises that the defendant be first adjudged liable to plaintiff before the third-party defendant may be held liable to the plaintiff, as precisely, the theory of defendant is that it is the third party defendant, and not he, who is directly liable to plaintiff. The situation contemplated by appellants would properly pertain to situation (a) above wherein the third party defendant is being sued for contribution, indemnity or subrogation, or simply stated, for a defendant’s “remedy over.”