LAW ON EVIDENCE | PEOPLE VS. PARAGSA G.R. NO. L-44060, JULY 20, 1978
PEOPLE VS. PARAGSA
G.R. NO. L-44060, JULY 20, 1978
FACTS Benben Paragsa was charged with the rape of a 12 ½ year old girl, Mirasol Magallanes. The information alleged that victim was alone in her house when the Benben entered, intimidated her with a hunting knife, forced her to lie in bed and there they had intercourse. The deed was interrupted when her aunt Lita, knocked on the door of victim’s house. Incidentally, Aunt Lita testified that she had seen the accused exiting the house when she came knocking. The victim did not reveal what happened to her until 6 days after the incident. Accused interposed the “Sweetheart defense”. Defense claims in effect that there was no force or intimidation involved and that what Aunt Lita saw was not the aftermath of a rape, but was rather consensual sexual intercourse. Accused also presented witnesses claiming that they were indeed sweethearts. The CFI convicted Benben. CA affirmed the conviction. Who is more credible, the defense or the prosecution? Thus, whether or not the evidence justifies a conviction.
HELD A careful scrutiny of the record reveals that the prosecution's evidence is weak, unsatisfactory and inconclusive to justify a conviction. The Supreme court noted the absence of intimidation considering that the act took place in the daytime, in her house where she is surrounded by her neighbors. The victim could also have revealed the same the very moment she was confronted by her aunt Lita who asked her what the accused did to her upon entering the house immediately after the intercourse took place and not 3 days after. Furthermore, the prosecution was silent in the matter of the allegation that the victim and accused were sweethearts. They did not bother to rebut the testimony of the appellant and his witnesses to the effect that the accused and Mirasol were actually sweethearts; and that they had had two previous sexual communications previously. As to this silence, the Supreme Court explained:
The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth … is applicable in criminal cases provided: 1) that he heard and understood the statement; 2) that he was at liberty to interpose a denial; 3) that the statement was in respect to some matter affecting his rights or in which he was then interested, and calling, naturally, for an answer; 4) that the facts were within his knowledge; and 5) that the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence would be material to the issue. These requisites of admission by silence all obtain in the present case. Hence, the silence of Mirasol on the facts asserted by the accused and his witnesses may be safely construed as an admission of the truth of such assertion.
