CRIMINAL PROCEDURE | LEVISTE VS. CA, G.R. NO. 189122, MARCH 17, 2020
LEVISTE
VS. CA,
G.R.
NO. 189122, MARCH 17, 2020
TOPIC/DOCTRINE
After conviction by the [Regional] trial court, the presumption of
innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail
ends—from then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. A finding that none of the said
circumstances in Section 5 Rule 114 is present will not automatically result in
the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less
stringent sound discretion approach.
FACTS
Charged with the
murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12
years and one day of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
He appealed his
conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending
appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal,
citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any
risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail citing
well-established jurisprudence, it ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an
ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison
facility. It found that petitioner “… failed to show that he suffers from
ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement during trial will
permanently impair his health or put his life in danger. x x x Notably, the
physical condition of [petitioner] does not prevent him from seeking medical
attention while confined in prison, though he clearly preferred to be attended
by his personal physician.”
For purposes of determining whether petitioner’s application for
bail could be allowed pending appeal, the Court of Appeals also considered the
fact of petitioner’s conviction. It made a preliminary evaluation of petitioner’s
case and made a prima facie determination that there was no reason substantial
enough to overturn the evidence of petitioner’s guilt.
Petitioner claims that, in the absence of any of the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
an application for bail by an appellant sentenced by the Regional Trial Court
to a penalty of more than six years’ imprisonment should automatically be
granted.
ISSUE
In an application
for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a
penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature
of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be
granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?
RULING
NO.
The court ruled that One, pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
expressly declared to be discretionary. Two, the discretion to allow or disallow bail
pending appeal in a case such as this where the decision of the trial court
convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to
bailable is exclusively lodged by the rules with the appellate court. Thus, the
Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear and resolve petitioner’s urgent
application for admission to bail pending appeal. No capriciousness or
arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion was ever imputed to the appellate
court. After
conviction by the [Regional] trial court, the presumption of innocence
terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends—from then on,
the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. A finding that none of the said
circumstances in Section 5 Rule 114 is present will not automatically result in
the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less
stringent sound discretion approach.
