ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | VIVO V. MONTESA G.R. No. L-24576, JULY 29, 1968

VIVO V. MONTESA

G.R. No. L-24576, JULY 29, 1968

 

TOPIC/DOCTRINE

Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution, we perceive, does not require judicial intervention in the execution of a final order of deportation issued in accordance with law.  But the issuance of warrants of arrest by the Commissioners of Immigration, solely for purposes of investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued, conflicts with paragraph 3, Section 1, of Article III (Bill of Rights) of our Constitution.

 

FACTS

The private respondents Juan, Pedro, Julio, Marcelo, Jose, Manuel and Benito, all surnamed "Calacday" arrived in the Philippines from Hongkong, the first four on 18 November 1959, and the last three on 6 December 1959. After investigation, a board of special inquiry  found them to be the legitimate sons of a Filipino citizen, one Isaac Calacday, and thus admitted them into this country.

Sometime in February, 1963, however, Isaac Calacday confessed before an immigration official that the seven respondents were not his sons. He retracted his confession in March, 1963, in an investigation in the Department of Justice, with the explanation that, in a fit of anger, he disclaimed, under oath, paternity of the respondents because they refused to give him money

On 9 May 1963, Commissioner of Immigration Martiniano Vivo issued warrants of arrest against the herein private respondents, stating in said warrants their deportability under Section 37 (a) (1) and Section 37 (a) (2) in relation to Section 29(a) (17) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, for having entered the Philippines "by means of false and misleading statements and that they were not lawfully admissible at the time of entry, not being properly documented for admission." The warrants directed any immigration office or officer of the law to bring the respondents before the Commissioner, for them to show cause, if any there be, why they should not be deported. Manuel Calacday was subsequently arrested. The others remained at large.

On 27 May 1965, the respondent court, resolving the issue only of "whether the respondent Acting Commissioner of Immigration (therein petitioner) can summarily order the arrest and deportation of the petitioners (therein respondents) ..., without giving them a chance to be heard as Filipino citizens", and relying on the case of Commissioner of Immigration vs. Fernandez, et al., L-22696, 29 May 1964, issued the order, now being questioned before this Court.

 

ISSUE

Whether the arrest warrant was validly issued.

 

RULING

No.

The court ruled that it agree with petitioning Commissioner that the court below is without jurisdiction to restrain the deportation proceedings of respondents Calacdays.These proceedings are within the jurisdiction of the Immigration authorities under Sections 28 and 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act (C.A. No. 613). That jurisdiction is not tolled by a claim of Filipino citizenship, where the Commissioner or Commissioners have reliable evidence to the contrary; and said officers should be given opportunity to determine the issue of citizenship before the courts interfere in the exercise of the power of judicial review of administrative decisions.

Here, the court noted that it is clear from the order complained of that the court below misapprehended the import of the warrants issued by the Commissioner herein. Said warrants required the respondents to be brought to the immigration authorities, not to be deported, but "to show cause, if any there be, why he should not be deported from the Philippines", as expressly recited therein. There was no case of "summarily arresting and deporting" the respondents Calacdays, as unwarrantedly assumed by the court below. Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that, the issuance of warrants of arrest by the Commissioners of Immigration, solely for purposes of investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued, conflicts with paragraph 3, Section 1, of Article III (Bill of Rights) of our Constitution. It will be noted that the power to determine probable cause for warrants of arrest is limited by the Philippine Constitution to judge exclusively. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings.







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