ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | PHIL. COMMUNICATIONS CORP. V. ALCUAZ, 180 SCRA 218 (1989)
PHIL. COMMUNICATIONS CORP. V.
ALCUAZ,
180 SCRA 218 (1989)
TOPIC/DOCTRINE
Where a
public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its
acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the
person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to
notice and hearing.
FACTS
Petitioner
was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission, now
respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 placed under the
jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC, including all its
facilities and services and the fixing of rates. Implementing said Executive
Order No. 196, respondents required petitioner to apply for the requisite
certificate of public convenience and necessity covering its facilities and the
services it renders, as well as the corresponding authority to charge rates
therefor. petitioner filed with respondent NTC an application for authority to
continue operating and maintaining the same facilities it has been continuously
operating and maintaining since 1967, to continue providing the international
satellite communications services it has likewise been providing since 1967,
and to charge the current rates applied for in rendering such services. Pending
hearing, it also applied for a provisional authority so that it can continue to
operate and maintain the above mentioned facilities, provide the services and
charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for. petitioner was granted
a provisional authority which was valid for six (6) months which was extended 3
times, but the last extension directed the petitioner to charge modified
reduced rates through a reduction of fifteen percent (15%) on the present authorized
rates.
ISSUE
Whether the
Respondent violates procedural due process for having been issued without prior
notice and hearing in exercising its power to fix the rate of the Petitioner.
RULING
The court held that in so far as generalization is possible in
view of the great variety of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a
general rule that notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of
administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of
executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public
administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts
are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the person
whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice
and hearing.
Here,
the court ruled that respondents admit that the
application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by administrative
bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative. At any rate,
there remains the categorical admission made by respondent NTC that the
questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It,
however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed
order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary
in nature. This postulate is bereft of merit.