LAW ON PROPERTY | REYES V. MOSQUEDA 187 SCRA 661, JULY 23, 1990
REYES V. MOSQUEDA
187 SCRA 661, JULY 23, 1990
TOPIC/DOCTRINE
As early as
the case of Laureta v. Manta, et al., (44 Phil. 668 [1928]) this Court ruled
that the dispositions in a deed of donation—whether “inter vivos” or “mortis
causa” do not depend on the title or term used in the deed of donation but on
the provisions stated in such deed.
FACTS
Dr.
Emilio Pascual died intestate and without issue on November 18, 1972. He was
survived by his sister, Ursula Pascual and the children of his late sisters as
follows: (1) Maria Pascual Reyes—Ruperto Reyes and Jose Reyes; (2) Ines Pascual
Reyes—Jose P. Reyes, Benito Reyes, and Marina Reyes Manalastas; (3) Josefa
Pascual Reyes—Augusto Reyes and Benjamin Reyes; and (4) Escolastica Pascual
Dalusong (half-blood)—Pedro Dalusong.
On
December 3, 1973, the heirs of Dr. Pascual filed Special Proceedings No.
73-30-M in the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga for the administration
of his estate.
On
February 12, 1976, Ursula Pascual filed a motion to exclude some properties
from the inventory of Pascual’s estate and to deliver the titles thereto to
her. Ursula alleged that Dr. Pascual during his lifetime or on November 2, 1966
executed a “Donation Mortis Causa” in her favor covering properties which are
included in the estate of Dr. Pascual (subject of Special Proceedings No.
73-30-M) and therefore should be excluded from the inventory.
ISSUE
Whether a
donation is inter vivos or mortis causa.
RULING
Donation inter vivos.
The court ruled that it is, now
a settled rule that the title given to a deed of donation is not the
determinative factor which makes the donation “inter vivos” or “mortis causa.”
As early as the case of Laureta v. Manta, et al., (44 Phil. 668 [1928]) this
Court ruled that the dispositions in a deed of donation—whether “inter vivos”
or “mortis causa” do not depend on the title or term used in the deed of
donation but on the provisions stated in such deed. “Whether a donation
is inter vivos or mortis causa depends upon the nature of the disposition made.
‘Did the donor intend to transfer the ownership of the property donated upon
the execution of the donation? If this is so, as reflected from the provisions
contained in the donation, then it is inter vivos; otherwise, it is merely
mortis causa, or made to take effect after death.’ ”
Here, the court ruled that applying the above principles to the instant petitions, there is not doubt that the so-called DONATION MORTIS CAUSA is really a donation inter vivos. The donation was executed by Dr. Pascual in favor of his sister Ursula Pascual out of love and affection as well as a recognition of the personal services rendered by the donee to the donor. The transfer of ownership over the properties donated to the donee was immediate and independent of the death of the donor. The provision as regards the reservation of properties for the donor’s subsistence in relation to the other provisions of the deed of donation confirms the intention of the donor to give naked ownership of the properties to the donee immediately after the execution of the deed of donation.