ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION | LANUZA JR. VS. BF CORPORATION G.R. NO. 174938, OCTOBER 1, 2014
LANUZA
JR. VS. BF CORPORATION
G.R.
NO. 174938, OCTOBER 1, 2014
TOPIC/DOCTRINE
Corporate representatives may be
compelled to submit to arbitration proceedings pursuant to a contract entered
into by the corporation they represent if there are allegations of bad faith or
malice in their acts representing the corporation. Section 31 of the Corporation
Code provides the instances when directors, trustees, or officers may become
liable for corporate acts.
FACTS
In
1993, BF Corporation filed a collection complaint with the Regional Trial Court
against Shangri-La and the members of its board of directors: Alfredo C. Ramos,
Rufo B. Colayco, Antonio O. Olbes, Gerardo Lanuza, Jr., Maximo G. Licauco III,
and Benjamin C. Ramos.
BF
Corporation alleged in its complaint that on December 11, 1989 and May 30,
1991, it entered into agreements with Shangri-La wherein it undertook to
construct for Shangri-La a mall and a multilevel parking structure along EDSA. However,
by October 1991, Shangri-La started defaulting in payment. BF Corporation
alleged that despite repeated demands, Shangri-La refused to pay the balance
owed to it. It also alleged that the Shangri-La’s directors were in bad faith
in directing Shangri-La’s affairs. Therefore, they should be held jointly and
severally liable with Shangri-La for its obligations as well as for the damages
that BF Corporation incurred as a result of Shangri-La’s default.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s decision holding that petitioners, as directors, should submit
themselves as parties to the arbitration proceedings between BF Corporation and
Shangri-La Properties, Inc. (Shangri-La).
Petitioners’ main argument arises from
the separate personality given to juridical persons vis-à-vis their directors,
officers, stockholders, and agents. Since they did not sign the arbitration
agreement in any capacity, they cannot be forced to submit to the jurisdiction
of the Arbitration Tribunal in accordance with the arbitration agreement.
Moreover, they had already resigned as directors of Shangri-La at the time of
the alleged default.
ISSUE
Whether petitioners should be made
parties to the arbitration proceedings, pursuant to the arbitration clause
provided in the contract between BF Corporation and Shangri-La.
RULING
Yes.
The court ruled that a corporation, in
the legal sense, is an individual with a personality that is distinct and
separate from other persons including its stockholders, officers, directors,
representatives, and other juridical entities. a corporation’s representatives
are generally not bound by the terms of the contract executed by the
corporation. They are not personally liable for obligations and liabilities
incurred on or in behalf of the corporation. As a general rule, therefore, a
corporation’s representative who did not personally bind himself or herself to
an arbitration agreement cannot be forced to participate in arbitration
proceedings made pursuant to an agreement entered into by the corporation. However,
there are instances when the distinction between personalities of directors,
officers, and representatives, and of the corporation, are disregarded. We call
this piercing the veil of corporate fiction. Piercing the corporate veil is warranted when “[the
separate personality of a corporation] is used as a means to perpetrate fraud
or an illegal act, or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation,
the circumvention of statutes, or to confuse legitimate issues.” Thus, in cases alleging solidary
liability with the corporation or praying for the piercing of the corporate
veil, parties who are normally treated as distinct individuals should be made
to participate in the arbitration proceedings in order to determine if such
distinction should indeed be disregarded and, if so, to determine the extent of
their liabilities.
Here, the Arbitral Tribunal rendered a
decision, finding that BF Corporation failed to prove the existence of
circumstances that render petitioners and the other directors solidarily
liable. It ruled that petitioners and Shangri-La’s other directors were not
liable for the contractual obligations of Shangri-La to BF Corporation. The Arbitral
Tribunal’s decision was made with the participation of petitioners, albeit with
their continuing objection. In view of our discussion above, we rule that
petitioners are bound by such decision.