LAW ON SALES | ANG VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 567 SCRA 54, SEPTEMBER 29, 2008

ANG VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 

567 SCRA 54, SEPTEMBER 29, 2008

 

TOPIC/DOCTRINE

“Warranty,” Explained.—A warranty is a statement or representation made by the seller of goods, contemporaneously and as part of the contract of sale, having reference to the character, quality or title of the goods, and by which he promises or undertakes to insure that certain facts are or shall be as he then represents them.

 

FACTS

Under a “car-swapping” scheme, respondent Bruno Soledad (Soledad) sold his Mitsubishi GSR sedan 1982 model to petitioner Jaime Ang (Ang) by Deed of Absolute Sale1 dated July 28, 1992. For his part, Ang conveyed to Soledad his Mitsubishi Lancer model 1988, also by Deed of Absolute Sale2 of even date. As Ang’s car was of a later model, Soledad paid him an additional P55,000.00.

Ang, a buyer and seller of used vehicles, later offered the Mitsubishi GSR for sale through Far Eastern Motors, a second-hand auto display center. The vehicle was eventually sold to a certain Paul Bugash (Bugash) for P225,000.00, by Deed of Absolute Sale3 dated August 14, 1992. Before the deed could be registered in Bugash’s name, however, the vehicle was seized by virtue of a writ of replevin on account of the alleged failure of Ronaldo Panes, the owner of the vehicle prior to Soledad, to pay the mortgage debt5 constituted thereon. To secure the release of the vehicle, Ang paid BA Finance the amount of P62,038.476 on March 23, 1993. Soledad refused to reimburse the said amount, despite repeated demands.

For the sake of justice and equity, and in consonance with the salutary principle of non-enrichment at another’s expense, the RTC declared that defendant should reimburse plaintiff the P62,038.47.

The appellate court went on to hold that Soledad “has nothing to do with the transaction anymore; his obligation ended when he delivered the subject vehicle to the respondent upon the perfection of the contract of sale.” And it reiterated its ruling that the action, being one arising from breach of warranty, had prescribed, it having been filed beyond the 6-month prescriptive period.

 

ISSUE

Whether Ang invokes breach of warranty against eviction.

 

RULING

No.

Here, the Court held that in declaring that he owned and had clean title to the vehicle at the time the Deed of Absolute Sale was forged, Soledad gave an implied warranty of title. In pledging that he “will defend the same from all claims or any claim whatsoever [and] will save the vendee from any suit by the government of the Republic of the Philippines,” Soledad gave a warranty against eviction. Given Ang’s business of buying and selling used vehicles, he could not have merely relied on Soledad’s affirmation that the car was free from liens and encumbrances. He was expected to have thoroughly verified the car’s registration and related documents. Since what Soledad, as seller, gave was an implied warranty, the prescriptive period to file a breach thereof is six months after the delivery of the vehicle, following Art. 1571. But even if the date of filing of the action is reckoned from the date petitioner instituted his first complaint for damages on November 9, 1993, and not on July 15, 1996 when he filed the complaint subject of the present petition, the action just the same had prescribed, it having been filed 16 months after July 28, 1992, the date of delivery of the vehicle.

On the merits of his complaint for damages, even if Ang invokes breach of warranty against eviction as inferred from the second part of the earlier-quoted provision of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the following essential requisites for such breach, viz.: “A breach of this warranty requires the concurrence of the following circumstances: (1) The purchaser has been deprived of the whole or part of the thing sold; (2) This eviction is by a final judgment; (3) The basis thereof is by virtue of a right prior to the sale made by the vendor; and (4) The vendor has been summoned and made co-defendant in the suit for eviction at the instance of the vendee. In the absence of these requisites, a breach of the warranty against eviction under Article 1547 cannot be declared.” (Emphasis supplied), have not been met. For one, there is no judgment which deprived Ang of the vehicle. For another, there was no suit for eviction in which Soledad as seller was impleaded as co-defendant at the instance of the vendee.https://www.instagram.com/lawyalstudent/

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