CONFLICT OF LAWS | AUGUSTO BENEDICTO SANTOS III vs. NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, G.R. No. 101538 June 23, 1992

AUGUSTO BENEDICTO SANTOS III vs. NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES

G.R. No. 101538 June 23, 1992

 

TOPIC/DOCTRINE

It is the passenger’s “ultimate destination,” not “an agreed stopping place” that determines the country where suit against international carrier is to be filed.

Right to court access applies only where court has jurisdiction.

 

FACTS

This case involves the proper interpretation of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, reading as follows:

Art. 28. (1) An action for damage must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business through which the contract has been made, or before the court at the place of destination.

The petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines. Private respondent Nortwest Orient Airlines (NOA) is a foreign corporation with principal office in Minnesota, U.S.A., and licensed to do business and maintain a branch office in the Philippines.

On October 21, 1986, the petitioner purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket in San Francisco, U.S.A., for his flight from San Francisco to Manila via Tokyo and back. The scheduled departure date from Tokyo was December 20, 1986. No date was specified for his return to San Francisco.

On December 19, 1986, the petitioner checked in at the NOA counter in the San Francisco airport for his scheduled departure to Manila. Despite a previous confirmation and re-confirmation, he was informed that he had no reservation for his flight from Tokyo to Manila. He therefore had to be wait-listed.

On March 12, 1987, the petitioner sued NOA for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Makati. On April 13, 1987, NOA moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

On Citing the above-quoted article, it contended that the complaint could be instituted only in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, before:

  1. the court of the domicile of the carrier;
  2. the court of its principal place of business;
  3. the court where it has a place of business through which the contract had been made;
  4. the court of the place of destination.

The private respondent contended that the Philippines was not its domicile nor was this its principal place of business. Neither was the petitioner’s ticket issued in this country nor was his destination Manila but San Francisco in the United States.

 

ISSUE

Do Philippine Courts have jurisdiction over the case?

 

RULING

The Court ruled that the constitutional guaranty of access to courts refers only to courts with appropriate jurisdiction as defined by law. It does not mean that a person can go to any court for redress of his grievances regardless of the nature or value of his claim. But the more important consideration is that the treaty has not been rejected by the Philippine government. The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus does not operate automatically to render the treaty inoperative. There is a necessity for a formal act of rejection, usually made by the head of State, with a statement of the reasons why compliance with the treaty is no longer required.

Here, the Court ruled that if the petitioner is barred from filing his complaint before our courts, it is because they are not vested with the appropriate jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention, which is part of the law of our land.

The Court ruled that it is the passenger’s “ultimate destination,” not “an agreed stopping place” that determines the country where suit against international carrier is to be filed.

Here, the Court ruled that examination of the petitioner’s ticket shows that his ultimate destination is San Francisco. Although the date of the return flight was left open, the contract of carriage between the parties indicates that NOA was bound to transport the petitioner to San Francisco from Manila. Manila should therefore be considered merely an agreed stopping place and not the destination.

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