CRIMINAL LAW II CASE DIGEST/ LUCIANO V. PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR, 28 SCRA 517
LUCIANO V. PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR,
28 SCRA 517
TOPIC/DOCTRINE
The suspension envisioned in Section 13
of Republic Act 3019 is mandatory but is not self-operative.
Under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, reelection of a public official does not bar prosecution
for crimes committed by him prior thereto because, first, said Act makes no
time distinctions; second, one of the penalties that attach thereunder is
perpetual disqualification, which extends beyond a particular term of office;
and third, crimes under the Act prescribe in ten years. If reelection condones
previous criminal acts of an elective official punishable under it, then, after
the reelection of an official no crime committed by him prior thereto becomes
repressible even if the time marked by the statute of limitations has not yet
run out. This is patently offensive to the objectives and the letter of the Act.
FACTS
On January 18, 1969, First Assistant
Provincial Fiscal B. Jose Castillo instituted Criminal Case 18821 in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal against Makati Mayor Maximo Estrella, Vice-Mayor
Teotimo Gealogo, Councilors Justino Ventura, Pedro Ison, Ignacio Babasa, and Bernardo
Nonato (respondent elective municipal officials) and others, for violation of
Sections 3-G and 4-B of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. 1 The criminal information therefor substantially
charged that, on or about July 26, 1967, Mayor Estrella and his co-accused,
conspiring and confederating together, unlawfully entered into a contract with
JEF Enterprises for delivery and installation of 59 traffic deflectors valued
at P1,426.50 each, 34 units thereof having been delivered, installed and paid
for in the total amount of P48,841.00, less 10% which was retained, such
contract being manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the municipal
government of Makati and to the latter’s prejudice.
ISSUE
Is the suspension mentioned in Section 13
of Republic Act 3019 automatic?
RULING
The
court held that the suspension envisioned in Section
13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of a public official against
whom a criminal prosecution under a valid information under the Act or under
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, is
mandatory because of the use of the word "shall", but is not
self-operative, not only because the phrase "shall be suspended" used
therein can only mean that there must be someone who shall exercise the act of
suspension, but also because under the said section suspension follows the
pendency in court of a criminal prosecution under a "valid
information," which means that there must first be a determination that the
information filed is valid.