CRIMINAL LAW CASE DIGEST | PEOPLE V. DE JOYA, 98 PHIL. 238

PEOPLE V. DE JOYA,

98 PHIL. 238

TOPIC/DOCTRINE

The determination of the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence within the range provided by law is left entirely within the discretion of the trial court, and this discretion should not be interfered with except in case of abuse.

FACTS

On November 5, 1951, Gaudencio de Joya, Nicanor Reyes, Julian Sumaway, Cesar Manipola, and Ricardo Hornales were charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of theft.

Appellant admits that the maximum term of his sentence is correct. He likewise admits that its minimum term (4 months of arresto mayor) is within the range prescribed by the Indeterminate Sentence Law in this case, which is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, or f rom 2 months and 1 day to 4 months. His only argument in support of the appeal is that (1) the properties stolen having been recovered, (2) this being his first offense, and (3) he having pleaded guilty to the charge, which shows repentance for his act and lack of perversity in defying the law, the lower Court should have imposed upon him as the minimum of his indeterminate sentence, the lowest range of arresto mayor, which is 2 months and 1 day.

ISSUE

Is the fact that the properties stolen were recovered exempts on the determination of his penalty?

Is his plea of guilt is required to be considered (by way of mitigation) the imposition of the minimum term of his sentence?

RULING

No in all issues.

The court held that the determination of the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence within the range provided by law is left entirely within the discretion of the trial court, and this discretion should not be interfered with except in case of abuse.

Here, the court held that the appellant’s arguments fail to show any such abuse. The fact that the properties stolen were recovered merely exempts appellant from civil liability, but has no bearing on the determination of his penalty; while his plea of guilt is required to be considered (by way of mitigation) only in the imposition of the maximum term of his sentence, and in this case, it has already been taken into account as offsetting the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, so that appellant was given only the medium period of the proper penalty as the maximum term of his sentence. As to the fact that the present offense is the first committed by this appellant, suffice it to say that the penalty fixed by the Code is usually for first offenses; for otherwise, the aggravating circumstances of recidivism or of reiteración (Article 14, Nos. 9 and 10, RPC) would come into play and operate to increase the penalty.

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