CRIMINAL LAW CASE DIGEST | PEOPLE V. DE JOYA, 98 PHIL. 238
PEOPLE V. DE JOYA,
98 PHIL. 238
TOPIC/DOCTRINE
The determination
of the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence within the range provided by
law is left entirely within the discretion of the trial court, and this
discretion should not be interfered with except in case of abuse.
FACTS
On November 5,
1951, Gaudencio de Joya, Nicanor Reyes, Julian Sumaway, Cesar Manipola, and
Ricardo Hornales were charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the
crime of theft.
Appellant admits
that the maximum term of his sentence is correct. He likewise admits that its
minimum term (4 months of arresto mayor) is within the range prescribed by the
Indeterminate Sentence Law in this case, which is arresto mayor in its minimum
and medium periods, or f rom 2 months and 1 day to 4 months. His only argument
in support of the appeal is that (1) the properties stolen having been
recovered, (2) this being his first offense, and (3) he having pleaded guilty
to the charge, which shows repentance for his act and lack of perversity in
defying the law, the lower Court should have imposed upon him as the minimum of
his indeterminate sentence, the lowest range of arresto mayor, which is 2
months and 1 day.
ISSUE
Is the fact that
the properties stolen were recovered exempts on the determination of his
penalty?
Is his plea of
guilt is required to be considered (by way of mitigation) the imposition of the
minimum term of his sentence?
RULING
No in all issues.
The court held
that the determination of the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence within
the range provided by law is left entirely within the discretion of the trial court,
and this discretion should not be interfered with except in case of abuse.
Here, the court
held that the appellant’s arguments fail to show any such abuse. The fact that
the properties stolen were recovered merely exempts appellant from civil
liability, but has no bearing on the determination of his penalty; while his
plea of guilt is required to be considered (by way of mitigation) only in the
imposition of the maximum term of his sentence, and in this case, it has
already been taken into account as offsetting the aggravating circumstance of
nocturnity, so that appellant was given only the medium period of the proper
penalty as the maximum term of his sentence. As to the fact that the present
offense is the first committed by this appellant, suffice it to say that the
penalty fixed by the Code is usually for first offenses; for otherwise, the
aggravating circumstances of recidivism or of reiteración (Article 14, Nos. 9
and 10, RPC) would come into play and operate to increase the penalty.